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Ethos as a Human Dwelling Place 
When ethical reflection appeared in philosophy, it was directed at discovering 
truths that would enable human beings to take care of themselves in a sensible 
way. Such care neither hindered cheerfulness nor was based on dictates and 
prohibitions. It assumed the value of life understood as active, subjective 
existence in the context of an intelligible world. It was both an obligation and a 
life strategy, combining the perspectives of truth and goodness. Life inspired by 
the ancient concept of care was supposed to advance the “development of the 
art of being.”  
This art of being should consider the fact that humans can exist, live, 
act, and adopt specific forms and meanings only within the surroundings with 
which they interact. These interactions ought to become an object of ethical 
consideration. Humans influence their surroundings, and by changing them 
they gain new challenges and inspirations, which in turn can lead to the 
discovery of new possibilities for existence for both people and the system in 
which their surroundings are ordered.  
If we, after Heidegger, follow the etymology of the word “ethos,” which 
is the basis of the term introduced by Aristotle, we would learn that “Ethos 
means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man 
dwells. […] The designation reflects on this dwelling” (Heidegger 1977, 118-
119). In the original sense, ethos was the name of the place where “a plant 
grows without obstacles, where it can live and fructify” (Tischner 1982, 53). In 
order for human beings to “bear [their] own fruit,” they must first find the right 
ethos, namely one’s environment, “home,” or sphere of life as the space that 
facilitates understanding, making choices, and acting.  
An inhabited area can be opened up through meetings convened by 
people. Thus, an encounter constitutes a crucial element of ethos. It adds human 
character to one’s surroundings and allows it to vibrate with life. Direct 
encounters with someone or something appearing in the human surroundings 
exist, with indirect encounters occurring through traces of some activity.  
The notion of “traces” comes from ontology and points to the existence 
of something not immediately accessible to us. It refers to what is missing here 
and now, and it inspires us to transcend the present situation. It suggests the 
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existence of a reality different from the one we are currently in. Thus, the 
notion of traces may contain depths from which it is worth learning.  
On account of our ability to notice and recognize traces, journeys 
broaden the mind and store knowledge of epochs and people in books and 
works of art. Additionally, this ability is beneficial for our safety, enabling us, for 
example, to anticipate the possibility of coming across predators. Traces are 
handy in finding water, following the way to a settlement, or in hunting. There 
are also traces left by experience in our memory; they affect how we think, 
value, and act. In Trace and Presence Barbara Skarga says “The whole history is 
nothing else than reading traces. What is science if not an attempt to reveal the 
sources of phenomena that left traces in observable events? Everything is a 
trace of what has passed; everywhere we are faced with traces, since presence 
escapes cognition” (Skarga 2002, 73). Traces are a form of presence in the 
sense of the French être présents, or being present. Due to the traces left by 
some being, it can be—to some extent—available even after it has disappeared 
in the sense of il y a, or being in some place.  
In order to use traces, one needs to be aware of the continuity of time 
and be able to move in its three dimensions. A trace relates to a past presence; 
it allows us to reveal the past. It also helps us to discover the prerequisites or 
possibilities for events and encounters that might occur. In this sense, a trace 
affects the shape of the future. It exists because of the links between the 
present, the past, and the future. Traces can be found in architecture, books, 
music, clothes, habits, principles of co-existence, festivals, and poetry. We 
become parts of the living system by depicting traces that constitute it, and we 
find how essential it is to our identity. Through encounters we build our 
cultural identity. As embodied beings, rooted in our environment, we become 
strong and gain a sense of security, which allows us to meet and dialogue with 
other cultures, to become hospitable, and to creatively influence the fate of our 
own culture.  
The ability to realize encounters is very important in the art of being. 
Through direct and indirect meetings we become aware of our surroundings. 
They help us to discover our own possibilities for being. They open up our 
dwelling place.  
Types of Encounters 
For an encounter to happen, the existence of difference is necessary; it is not, 
however, sufficient. Pluralism does not always enhance the possibilities offered 
by an encounter with otherness. This can be easily understood by thinking of 
relationships in terms of an ecosystem paradigm. However, understanding may 
not be reached when we perceive relationships in the subject-object scheme. 
Jean-François Lyotard ,  a  promoter of  plural ism,  suggested that 
consensus be replaced with “justice,” which centers our attention on “speaking 
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out.” Understood in this way, however, justice does not yet guarantee that the 
encounter will take place since this requires listening intently to a variety of 
opinions. Furthermore, the greatest danger to diversity is the atomization of 
differences, which leads some to reject the universalism that serves as a point 
of reference for those seeking truth.  
Depending on the perception of difference, we tend to contravene various 
types of encounters. Comprehension of difference is conditioned by our scheme of 
reasoning, which can be antagonistic, complementary, dialectic, or synergistic.  
Antagonistic thinking is reflected in the “either-or” approach. In this 
scheme, we assume that difference disqualifies or devalues diverging perspectives. 
As a result, we either reject difference and defend our own position or become 
fascinated with diversity, accepting it at the cost of our otherness. In neither case is 
the encounter enriching; it can only change us. Antagonistic thinking leads to 
competitive or hostile encounters. In contrast, complementary thinking can result in 
“supplementary” encounters, where the outcome is a combination of what the 
parties bring to the situation.  
Dialectical processes lead to a synthesis from thesis and antithesis. It 
produces encounters of a “common sense of loss.” Such an encounter permits a 
going beyond the level of thesis and antithesis, to the discovery of dialectic 
synthesis. In searching for synthesis, a dialectic encounter advances development 
and is characterized by open reasoning. Synthesis enriches the thesis by exploiting 
its potential.  
Another outcome of the encounter with difference can be achieved via 
synergistic thinking. It facilitates a move to the level of meta-reflection, helping us 
to reveal and understand the conditioning of the otherness of both ourselves and 
what we come across. Synergistic thinking helps us to recognize and better 
comprehend the implications of difference and allows for creative activity. It lies at 
the foundation of culture and civilization. In synergistic encounters we can 
transcend the borders of our own identity without forsaking it. The encounters 
based on synergistic thinking enrich our otherness without jeopardizing it with 
uniformity or conflict.  
Synergistic thinking requires respect for the otherness of those we meet, as 
well as an interest in the truth established by them (emet) and disclosed by them 
(aletheia). It involves ideas not yet set definitionally. Conflict inevitably results 
from the juxtaposition of terms referring to the same object with imposed closed 
meanings suggesting various interpretations.  
Difference includes a whole range of characteristics that potentially 
distinguish, antagonize, justify falsehoods and errors, and enrich encounters. It 
does not determine the outcome definitively; it is we who decide how difference 
is handled. Thus, it can be a source of antagonism, conflict, aggression, and 
destruction. How can we prevent the disruptive effects of difference? Justice, in 
the sense proposed by Lyotard, may presuppose indifference that results in 
justification of evil and error. An Aristotelian middle ground between 
antagonism and indifference could be identified as “hospitality.” Hospitality 
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allows us to sincerely play host to guests in our home without allowing them to 
vandalize it. A hospitable encounter supports a deeper, wiser understanding of 
both what is ours and what we identify with, as well as what is different and 
what we are hospitably open to. Both parties benefit from this type of the 
encounter. The guests too, entering into “our otherness” without the intention 
of destroying it, can begin a dialogue with it.  
Value of Dialogue  
The value of dialogue has been unfolded by various philosophers. The oldest 
paradigm, proposed by Socrates, ordered the course of encounters to better 
arrive at truth. In his framework for encounters, Socrates provided that they 
initiate the search for truth without necessarily leading to a final conclusion 
enclosed within what we have revealed, named, or defined. This scheme of 
encounter managed to protect cognition from stagnating under the influence of 
rigid definitions; it maintained the balance between the two types of truth: emet 
and aletheia. From an ethical perspective, both notions of truth are valuable not 
so much because they provide us with knowledge, but because they make 
people realize their ignorance and inspire them to look for the truth.  
Martin Buber’s writing about encounters is particularly interesting 
here from the perspective of ethics. He observed that human life is led among 
objects and other people. It means experiencing the otherness we feel in bodies 
and things and that we witness in someone else. However, the difference 
between experiencing objects (bodies and things) and experiencing subjects 
(other people) is significant. An object meets another object, but objects do not 
cross their borders (for Buber, each object remains an “it”). In contrast, “I” and 
“You” function as subjects in the encounter; they do not border anything, for 
they exist in a relationship (Buber 1974, 292). In Buber’s concept of 
encounters we can find inspiration to realize how great an influence we can 
have on both the process and effects of our encounters with otherness.  
 Buber distinguished three spheres in which humans encounter the 
world. In the first, the “technical,” the relation of existential-objective “I-it” takes 
place. The second is seen as a disguised monologue: “You” is brought to “I” and 
the “encountered” subject is treated as an aspect of one’s own ego. Buber 
deems the third way in which a person encounters the world as the genuine 
dialogue. Here we have the direct, encounter I-You, which is anti-instrumental.  
In the technical approach we face the modern subject-object paradigm. 
These relations are linear and unilateral. Here it is the “I” that is active. It 
influences even the perception of “it” as an object to exploit. The existential-
objective attitude adopted in the “technical” perspective excludes dialogue. 
Similarly, the disguised monologue does not provide any chance for dialogue: “I” 
is so self-oriented that it fails to perceive anything apart from itself. It is unable 
to dialogue with any “You.”  
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According to Buber, participants in dialogue must engage 
authentically—i.e., they must reveal to one another the entire truth of their 
existence. The successful dialogue requires of them a sufficient degree of 
involvement in the encounter. They must be sincere and open. The proper 
starting point is not a priori agreement with the interlocutor, but acceptance of 
her otherness. Instead of being threating, otherness begins to arouse interest. 
Buber’s notion of dialogue aims to give encounters the potential for 
discovering truth—the emet of “You.” This begs the question of whether such 
encounters can happen by means of “traces” left by a “You.”  
According to Emmanuel Levinas’s interpretation, engaging in a 
dialogical encounter means entering an ethical sphere. In the beginning, he 
understood this to include liberation from loneliness, though ultimately he 
suggested that it involved an “opening to infinity.” The Other leaves a trace in 
the encountered. Never is the encounter with the Other neutral. It always has a 
meaning: it can produce goodness and truth, it calls for responsibility towards 
and for the Other, and it provides the chance to discover oneself. The “face” of 
the Other is the key to the infinite. It shows the trace of God. For Levinas, the 
encounter with the other becomes an ethical and religious act. By directing 
individuals towards transcendence, it creates their bond with both people and 
God.  
The meeting with the Other is neither easy nor automatic. It 
presupposes will and effort, which not everyone is able to undertake. According 
to Levinas, the encounter with others always takes place in an ethical 
dimension. In the dialogical encounter one learns being towards others to 
discover oneself. Dialogue is, thus, an ethical relation.  
Levinas, who experienced the birth of two totalitarian systems—
communism and fascism—remarked that members of mass societies are 
characterized by anonymity and the lack of social bonds. These features trigger 
indifference towards the other that results in helplessness in people and a 
susceptibility to evil. Levinas’s call for the recognition of the other’s face in 
order for there to be an encounter in which dialogue enables one to bear 
responsibility suggests how to avoid the pitfalls of the human-unfriendly 
atomized sphere, how to break with selfishness and indifference, and how to 
protect oneself from the temptation to disconnect and become isolated.  
The ethical value of dialogue was presented differently by Józef 
Tischner, whose philosophy of dialogue is often called the philosophy of drama. 
It sees the beginning of the entire enterprise of the philosophical search in 
interpersonal dialogue. Tischner points to two kinds of relationships: that 
existing between humans and the world, and that between people. There is a 
difference between how humans approach the world (the scene) and other 
people. When describing the human-world relation, Tischner sees the space of 
human life as the scene in which the drama of everyday struggles with the 
world is played out. In the case of the relationship between human beings, he 
Value of an Encounter from an Ethical Perspective 
 
 
118 
 
emphasizes dialogical reciprocity. In the dialogical relationship, the “Asker” and 
the “Asked” stand face to face. The former makes the latter a participant in the 
situation. A human can surely be treated as an element of the scene, but then 
an encounter in the relation of human-human cannot occur.  
Tischner’s interpretation of the encounter discovers the Asker who 
expects an answer. Awareness of the necessity to provide an answer enables us 
to feel the presence of other people (Tischner 1982, 12-21). In the encounter 
one learns that there is also another world apart from one’s own—the world of 
the other. Thus, the encounter induces thinking. Moreover, it has an 
agathological dimension; it is an ethical situation, the primary source of an 
ethical experience.  
Encounter in the Ecosystem Paradigm 
In the new paradigm of reasoning inspired by environmentalism, a human 
being is perceived as an element of functional systems constituted by 
relationships. The modern scheme of thinking about relationships (subject-
object) is being supplanted by the ecosystem paradigm. The meaning of this 
new approach for the development of contemporary perception and 
interpretation of reality was emphasized by historian and sociologist Edgar 
Morin, who explored the origins of ecological awareness that changes our 
world view. He points to what he sees as the fundamental conclusion of one of 
the pioneers of biological revolution, Erwin Schrodinger: ecosystems co-
organize and participate in programming the organisms that belong to them 
(Morin 1977, 46). Morin, accentuating the theoretical outcomes of this 
assumption as extraordinarily significant, writes: “The ecosystem relationship 
is not an external relation of two closed beings, but an interactive correlation 
between two open systems, each constituting both a whole and a part of the 
other one” (Morin 1977, 46). Morin appreciates the consequences of the 
introduction of a new scheme of relationships based on the ecosystem 
paradigm. Here the account of relationships differs from the unilateral, linear 
subject-object relationship that has framed understandings in modern science. 
In the linear, unilateral scheme of interdependencies the notion of determinacy, 
contrasted with the sovereignty of the subject, is crucial. Thus, the disjunction 
of “either freedom or determinacy” becomes obvious, and concern for 
subjectivity begins to be identified with avoiding any determinants. Modern, 
autonomous human beings withdraw into themselves in order to be free. They 
do not notice that encounters with others could broaden the range of 
possibilities, thus making them freer.  
The modern paradigm contains another trap. By stressing human 
subjectivity in the subject-object framework, contemporary humanism 
simultaneously involves the threat of objectifying people. Thinking in 
accordance with this paradigm implies seeing others and even ourselves as 
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objects of our acts and consideration. It is not then difficult to treat an 
objectified other, or even ourselves, as a means to our ends, contrary to 
Immanuel Kant’s requirement.  
The ecosystem paradigm thus allows us to avoid identified modern 
dangers. Humans want to enter relationships in order to discover possibilities 
in their surroundings and their own potential for activity. In such relationships 
they do not feel threatened by the deprivation of subjectivity or by the deficit of 
freedom. They appreciate the value of encounters and of togetherness, as 
opposed to living in separation from others. When alienated, we do not become 
a part of the whole that could be an enriching part of us. 
Were we to see relationships in keeping with the ecosystem paradigm, 
causality would no longer be linear and one-sided; we would become capable of 
finding new aspects of human interdependencies and of understanding our 
relationship with, and links to, the environment, conversely to the modern 
paradigm. This new understanding implies a sense of responsibility bound to 
the awareness that our “gestalt” and that of others is affected by our activities 
and through the construction of the environment and interactions we initiate. 
 Reflections on our surroundings trigger the recognition of their two 
dimensions: the first might be called the “environment,” the second “space.” 
The former refers to the objective existence of our surroundings, whereas 
“space” indicates the way it is imagined, perceived, and experienced through 
the schemes of reasoning and valuing. Both of these notions aid in our 
comprehension of the human situation and our recognition of the relationships 
in which we are involved. They imply an understanding of human beings in 
their physical and spiritual dimensions, inducing considerations of the 
relationships between these dimensions.  
What surrounds us is essential as it encourages or provokes us to 
respond to opportunities that it creates. It impacts what we can achieve in our 
human potentiality, but it does not automatically determine us. Human beings 
take advantage of the chances offered by our surroundings according to our 
will and ability. We are, after all, ethical subjects—i.e., “relatively isolated 
systems”—with inner centers of activity.1 We are responsible2 for the outcomes 
                                                             
1 Roman Ingarden introduced the notion of “system” to reflections on responsibility. 
The idea of relatively isolated systems proved advantageous in the discussion 
concerning conditions that must be fulfilled by a subject of responsibility. The basic 
requirement to become a subject of responsibility is having “a centre of action that 
enables [us] to [...] undertake initiative.” According to Ingarden, “an acting person (an 
entity that constitutes unity together with the body) must form a system relatively 
isolated, a system of a quite particular kind, one that is not possible in lifeless things and 
cannot even realize itself in all living beings” (See: Ingarden 1972, 133-134). 
2 It is worth distinguishing between “responsibility for” and “responsibility towards.” 
The former can be understood as the awareness that our activities have effects and that 
we create them even when we do not realize it. “Responsibility towards” comes as a 
result of our obligations towards the environment.  
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of what we do, or leave undone. The scope of human responsibility is apparent 
in light of our ability to change, choose, construct consciously, and even create 
our surroundings. We change the environment by determining what is external 
to us, while we modify the space in two ways: by developing or destroying our 
ability to perceive and understand the environment, and by altering it. The 
shape of the space greatly depends on our human capabilities and cognitive 
skills. 
Before we can state that human beings can be creative in the area set 
by the value of truth, and that we are capable of creative reflection, we must 
think more carefully about basic understandings of the connection between 
reality and its representations—environment and human space—which can be 
boiled down to a confrontation between “original” and “copy.” We need to 
realize that representation is not a mere copy of existence. It establishes itself 
within the framework of reasoning of which it is a part. Creative thinking 
initiates new systems of understanding that enable new possibilities of 
perception to be realized. Consequently, we discover new aspects of the 
manifestations of reality, are encouraged to raise new questions, and while 
searching for answers we can initiate new phenomena of being. In this context, 
it becomes imperative to ask: “How should it be?”; a praxeological perspective 
ought to be complemented with an ethical one. An ethics of creativity that looks 
for universal axiological truths is necessary, enabling us to verify values 
proposed by further systems of the profane. The universal axiological truths 
discovered in synergistic thinking, at the meta-level of diverse actualized 
systems of being, allow us to notice goals other than those implied by these 
systems. As a result, they are indispensable for people to be able and willing to 
act innovatively.  
While preparing to creatively exist in the world, we must facilitate 
comprehensive human development that is versatile enough to enable us to 
have synergistic encounters and experiences of the enchantment of the world. 
Through disenchantment we had reduced the world to its current character of 
the profane and we had disconnected it from mystery and transcendence. The 
transcendent dimension is essential for thinking about the possibility of going 
beyond the borders of the here and now. In order to handle life creatively, 
modern people should “break the spell” that fossilizes the world and humans in 
their current form and replace it with enchantment inducing the search for 
truth that has not yet been “touched.” In contrast to the epistemologically 
dominant ocular-centric metaphor in which clear vision is linked with 
knowledge, the metaphor of “touch” is helpful here for thinking about 
cognition. We owe it to physicists who acknowledge that the truths revealed by 
their research are responses to a way of touching reality, which corresponds 
well with reflections concerning human creative skills. It helps to recognize 
that people can be creative also in the sphere of cognitive activity. We must be 
able to use our creative capacities when looking for both ethical and 
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praxeological dimensions of our space, and to realize its openness actualized 
through encounters with otherness.  
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Abstract: This article investigates the relationship between the possibilities of 
actualizing our encounters and the openness of human space. It describes 
various types of encounters and shows the correlations between the 
perception of difference and the inclination to contravene certain encounters. 
The effects of encounters based on antagonistic, complementary, dialectic, and 
synergistic thinking are explored in a way that helps to better understand the 
aims and consequences of encounters actualized in diverse frameworks of 
dialogue. Further, the impact of paradigms of reasoning on how the value of 
meetings is understood is described. The results of the modern perception of 
relationships in the subject-object scheme and in the ecosystem paradigm are 
presented. The latter allows for recognition that encounters can facilitate 
creative activity by expanding human space. 
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